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Why Saudi Arabia’s Problem in Yemen Goes Beyond the Battlefield

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Saudi backed forces announced the capture of Mocha on Yemen’s Red Sea coast on 5 October. Three days later, nearly half the flights scheduled to depart Riyadh were cancelled or did not operate amid renewed missile attacks. Saudi Arabia may gain ground in Yemen without making its own airports safe.

The government in Aden says its allies have recovered Mocha and positions around Dhubab. Sana’a disputes those claims. Neither account, on its own, establishes where the front line now runs.

Ansar Allah still holds Sana’a and much of northern Yemen, including major population centres. It does not need to conquer the country to retain a decisive place in negotiations over its future. An advance towards Taiz, Marib or Aden would expose it to rival armed groups and local interests that cannot be overcome by military force alone.

Previously published in Telegraph Online

The threat inside Saudi Arabia

On 8 October, Ansar Allah spokesman Yahya Saree claimed a missile attack on King Khalid International Airport. The Saudi coalition said it had intercepted missiles heading towards Riyadh. Falling debris damaged buildings in the capital, while airlines suspended services. Aviation data from Cirium recorded 169 of 378 scheduled departures as cancelled or not operating. The claimed direct hit on the airport remains disputed.

The disruption gives Ansar Allah leverage far beyond the territory it controls. Airlines must make decisions about safety and schedules even when an airport remains operational. A force launching missiles from inland Yemen can impose costs that cannot be removed simply by recapturing coastal towns.

What Riyadh can achieve

Saudi backed forces can recover roads, ports and coastal positions. Improved air defences and support from Turkey and Pakistan may reduce the danger to Saudi cities. Riyadh also has financial and military resources that Ansar Allah cannot match.

But Ansar Allah has limits too. It must govern the territory it holds, sustain its forces and contend with Yemenis who reject its authority. Its capacity to threaten Saudi Arabia does not give it a mandate to rule the rest of Yemen.

A settlement would have to address attacks across the border, Saudi military operations and restrictions affecting Yemen, as well as the claims of political forces in the south and east. Battlefield gains may change the terms on which those questions are negotiated. They cannot settle them on their own.

Riyadh could recover the southwestern coast and still face missile launches from northern Yemen. That is the measure of its predicament: military success may improve its position without delivering the security it seeks.