The Post Itself

The Photograph

Washington’s Blunt Realization

Donald J. Trump, never one for subtlety, put it bluntly: “Looks like we’ve lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China. May they have a long and prosperous future together!” Behind the quip lies a sobering reality. The United States, through a combination of missteps, hubris, and historical blindness, now finds itself estranged from two of the great powers it once sought to court.

Russia has long since broken away, hardened by sanctions and war. India, once hailed in Washington as the democratic counterweight to Beijing, has slipped into a posture of wary distance, trading more with Moscow, smiling more at Beijing, and refusing to be a reliable ally. Trump’s lament is not only about his own administration’s failures. It is about a deeper unraveling of American influence, one that has been building for decades.

The Long Estrangement with Russia

The Russian alienation from the United States is not a story of one war or one president, but of three decades of accumulated mistrust. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington was presented with an opportunity: integrate Russia into a common European security order, or expand NATO eastward. The choice it made — repeatedly — was expansion. The alliance grew in waves, from Poland and the Czech Republic to the Baltics, and then floated the possibility of Ukraine and Georgia.

To American eyes, this was natural: countries seeking security guarantees from Moscow’s shadow were free to join. But to Russian leaders — from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin — it looked like encirclement. They remembered informal conversations in 1990, when Western diplomats told Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not move “one inch eastward.” Those words, though never codified, lingered as a broken promise.

By 2014, when Ukraine’s pro-Russian president was ousted after the Maidan protests, Moscow saw proof of Western meddling. The Kremlin annexed Crimea and backed separatists in Donbass. Washington responded with sanctions and military aid to Kyiv. The cycle hardened. By the time of Russia’s full invasion in 2022, the rupture was complete. Sanctions cut Russia off from Western finance and technology. U.S. intelligence and weaponry flowed into Ukraine. Moscow reoriented its economy toward China, Iran, and the Global South.

India’s Drift

India’s story is different, subtler — and in some ways more consequential. For years, Washington has courted New Delhi. Successive presidents hailed India as a natural partner: the world’s largest democracy, a counterweight to China, a fast-growing economy eager for investment. Military ties deepened, joint naval exercises expanded, and Indian-American professionals became a symbol of cultural fusion.

But India has never been comfortable in anyone’s camp. Its foreign policy, crafted since independence, is rooted in what it calls “strategic autonomy.” Today, it calls its stance “multi-alignment”: joining the Quad with the U.S. and Japan one day, standing beside Xi and Putin at a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit the next. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been explicit. His foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, tells Western audiences that Europe’s problems are not automatically the world’s problems, and that India will buy oil from Russia if it is cheaper. “It is my moral duty,” he said, “to ensure the best deal for Indian consumers.”

The rhetoric is not bluster. India has bought record volumes of Russian crude, processed it in its refineries, and even re-exported fuels to Europe. Washington has objected, even imposing new tariffs on Indian exports. But New Delhi has not budged. The result: a relationship once touted as the centerpiece of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy now looks brittle. India may never align outright with Beijing — border clashes in 2020 proved that China is still a security adversary — but nor will it be Washington’s dependable ally.

The SCO Optics

The photograph Trump mocked was no accident. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathering in Tianjin this week, Xi, Putin, and Modi stood together, projecting a tableau of multipolar solidarity. For China, it was a chance to display global leadership, an alternative pole to American dominance. For Russia, it was reassurance that it is not isolated, despite Western sanctions. For India, it was about keeping options open — participating in a club dominated by China and Russia while still maintaining ties with the United States.

For Washington, though, the optics are grim. It looks as though two major powers — one a nuclear superpower, the other a demographic giant — are drifting further into China’s orbit, leaving the U.S. isolated. Trump, in his usual brusque way, gave voice to what many analysts whisper: America has lost them.

Why the United States Failed

What explains this double estrangement? With Russia, it was triumphalism. The U.S. treated post-Soviet Russia not as a partner to be integrated, but as a defeated adversary to be contained. Expansion of NATO, promotion of “color revolutions,” and punitive sanctions created an adversary where a wary partner might have been possible.

With India, it was coercion. The U.S. assumed that shared values and fear of China would be enough to bind New Delhi to Washington. But when Washington demanded compliance — stop buying Russian oil, back Western sanctions, align against Beijing — India resisted. Tariffs and scolding only confirmed its instinct to remain autonomous.

In both cases, American policymakers misread the other side’s priorities. For Russia, security guarantees mattered more than economic integration. For India, autonomy mattered more than alignment. In both cases, Washington pushed against those priorities, and lost.

The Counterarguments

Of course, not everyone agrees. Mainstream analysts argue that Russia alienated itself — by invading neighbors, suppressing dissent, and violating the UN Charter. They argue that India has not “defected” but simply hedges, and that Washington still has leverage through technology transfers and diaspora ties.

But even those more sympathetic to Washington admit the trend lines are troubling. Sanctions have not broken Russia. Tariffs have not bent India. Both countries appear more comfortable working with China than with Washington, at least in certain domains.

The Multipolar Moment

The broader context is the emergence of a multipolar world. The post-Cold War moment of unipolar U.S. dominance is over. New centers of power — Beijing, Moscow, Delhi, even smaller states asserting autonomy — are no longer content to follow Washington’s lead.

The Ukraine war accelerated this. Sanctions pushed Russia closer to China. Energy deals linked Moscow to Delhi. Western double standards, in the eyes of many in the Global South, eroded moral authority. Meanwhile, China used its economic clout to draw countries into its orbit, offering infrastructure, trade, and political cover. The result is what some scholars call a “neo-non-aligned” world: not countries declaring loyalty to Beijing, but countries refusing loyalty to Washington.

Trump’s Role

Trump himself is hardly blameless. His tariffs on Indian goods, his transactional approach to alliances, and his erratic handling of foreign leaders strained ties. With Russia, his rhetoric was oddly admiring of Putin, but his administration maintained — even expanded — sanctions. The mixed signals did little to repair trust. Now, out of office, Trump positions himself as the truth-teller, lamenting what others won’t admit. Yet his own policies contributed to the very losses he now decries.

The Costs of Alienation

Losing Russia and India has consequences. With Russia, the cost is obvious: a prolonged war in Ukraine, a hardened Eurasian bloc, and the re-emergence of Moscow as a spoiler aligned with Beijing. With India, the cost is subtler: the weakening of the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy, the erosion of its ability to balance China, and the loss of credibility in the so-called “Global South.” For Washington, the irony is sharp. By pushing too hard, it achieved the opposite of what it intended. The containment of Russia pushed Moscow closer to China. The courting of India, laced with coercion, reinforced Delhi’s independence.

What Comes Next

If there is a path back, it will require humility — something in short supply in Washington. It would mean recognizing Russia’s security concerns, however unpalatable, and accepting India’s strategic autonomy, however frustrating. But the trajectory points the other way. American politics, polarized and punitive, leaves little room for nuance. Trump’s blunt outburst may be the closest Washington comes to admitting the obvious: in the contest for influence, the U.S. is not only losing friends but helping to push them away.