This report is written by a journalist and former Russian army officer with direct experience of frontline operations. The account is based on first hand observation and conversations along the active front, reflecting conditions...
The international system is no longer frictionless. Industrial constraint in Ukraine, cost exchange asymmetries in the Red Sea, rising United States debt service, China’s manufacturing scale, and energy intensity in artificial intelligence all signal structural change. Multipolarity is not rhetorical aspiration. It is emerging through theatre denial, industrial depth, and fiscal limits, even as some American foreign policy journals insist the world remains unipolar.
Sanae Takaichi’s decision to describe a Taiwan contingency as a “survival-threatening situation” has pushed Japan–China tensions into legal and economic territory. Beijing answered with export controls, travel pressure, and a post-1945 order narrative anchored in UNGA Resolution 2758. What began as parliamentary language is becoming institutional escalation across doctrine, trade, and history.
China is not preparing to fight for Iran. It is doing something more consequential: managing the Iran file as part of its western energy and security perimeter, using diplomacy, regional mechanisms, security signalling, and deniable support to prevent isolation or collapse.
The June 2025 war did not eliminate Iran’s nuclear risk or restore stable deterrence. It damaged the verification framework that made coercion credible, replacing a manageable threshold problem with enduring strategic ambiguity. In doing so, it narrowed military options, raised the cost of escalation, and pushed diplomacy back to the centre not by choice, but by constraint.
Israel’s conscription dispute is not mainly about religion or identity. Under the pressure of war and court rulings, the state is building special ultra Orthodox service units that restrict women’s routine presence, while draft legislation leans toward targets and gradual measures, leaving the manpower burden concentrated on those already serving.
The war in Ukraine did not create Western misjudgment about Russia. It exposed it. From officer culture and battlefield adaptation to industrial capacity and social endurance, assumptions formed after 1991 collapsed under the pressure of industrial war.
The Middle East security architecture does not exist in any meaningful sense. Fragmented regional actors, weak institutions, and rival alignments leave Iran negotiating deterrence bilaterally rather than regionally.
Telegraph Online long read A war with Iran would not be decided by intent or rhetoric, but by logistics. The United States can sustain an intense campaign for only a few days before stocks run out.
Military deployments, diplomatic signalling, and regional positioning around Iran are no longer isolated acts of deterrence. They are forming a process that advances even in the absence of a formal decision. This essay examines how force posture, political sunk costs, and incompatible assumptions may already be constraining the ability of any actor to stop escalation once it begins.
Russia now controls most of Donbas. What remains is a fortified Ukrainian army compressed into Kramatorsk and Sloviansk and sustained by just two vulnerable supply routes. Rather than storming these fortresses, Russian forces are methodically degrading the roads and rail lines that keep them alive. The decisive question is no longer territory, but whether Ukraine withdraws in time.
At Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the largest American military installation in the Middle East, subtle changes are underway. US fighter aircraft have deployed forward, an aircraft carrier has entered the region, and logistics activity has surged. The evidence points to preparation for conflict with Iran, while stopping short of a decision to fight.
American protection is no longer automatic. Europe is exposed, China is unavoidable but risky, and Britain is rebuilding optionality. Keir Starmer’s Beijing visit reflects a deeper structural shift in the Western system.
Britain and its allies left thousands of Islamic State detainees in Kurdish run camps as a temporary solution to a politically toxic problem. Now that system is breaking down. As Western governments engage Syria’s new leadership and Kurdish control erodes, the contradiction at the heart of detention by remembering is becoming impossible to ignore.
Xi Jinping’s removal of senior PLA generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli has fuelled speculation about power struggles inside China’s military. This article strips away conjecture and examines what is known, how the Communist Party disciplines the armed forces, and why the balance of evidence points toward corruption rather than a crisis of loyalty at the top of the PLA
When the United States seized Venezuela’s president, the spectacle was immediate but the real contest was not. China did not respond with noise or retaliation. It responded with doctrine: law, coalition-building, asset protection, and quiet leverage over the systems that matter. The raid was a moment. The struggle over custody, compliance, and power beneath it is ongoing.
China has crossed into the catapult carrier era. The decisive question now is whether it can sustain carrier operations at sea. The Type 054B frigate Luohe signals that Beijing is formalising the escort screen that turns carrier aviation from a symbol into a working system.
The war in Ukraine did not break NATO. It exposed structural weaknesses that have existed inside the alliance for decades. This is an institutional autopsy of NATO as a war fighting system and why its political promises now exceed its military capacity.
Drone warfare did not begin in Ukraine. It began in Nagorno Karabakh and evolved into industrial attrition powered by civilian supply chains. This article explains how modern war shifted from weapons to components, why China’s dominance in drone manufacturing and sourcing makes sanctions structurally weak, and why today’s decisive battlefield runs through factories, logistics hubs, and payment systems far from the front line.
The United States is not short of power. It is short of closure. From Iran to Venezuela, Greenland to the Red Sea, Washington’s reliance on visible coercion is widening its obligations faster than it secures compliance. The result is not imminent collapse or world war, but a growing mismatch between reach, endurance, and political outcome.
As Ukraine’s cities go dark, Vladimir Putin has hardened Russia’s war aims. Moscow now ties any peace in Ukraine to a broader demand that NATO retreat to its pre-expansion footprint, effectively back to West Germany as it stood in 1998. This is no longer a war over territory. It is a campaign to force a renegotiation of Europe’s security order.
As Arctic ice retreats, the High North is being transformed from a frozen periphery into a strategic corridor. This chapter examines why Greenland matters not as territory or mineral wealth, but as fixed infrastructure anchoring military transit, sensing, and enforcement in a newly passable Arctic and why capability, not sovereignty claims, is shaping the redistribution of the North.
When Iran shut down the internet in January, it did more than silence social media. It severed coordination, visibility, and momentum. This analysis explains how information control, Starlink disruption, and force on the ground stalled a protest movement many assumed was unstoppable.
Western governments presented satellite internet as a democratic safeguard against repression. Iran treated it as hostile infrastructure and moved to deny it. As communications collapsed, protest momentum faded. The lesson is strategic rather than moral: satellite internet is now a contested battlespace.
A week of strikes, outages, and ship seizures suggests the war is shifting from front lines to systems. Heat, water, power, and sea interdictions now shape escalation more than map lines do. With arms control treaties thinning and trust collapsing, the danger is not one dramatic decision but a chain of smaller precedents that shorten decision time and raise miscalculation risk.
In the early hours of a freezing January night, Ukraine’s war was felt not through explosions but through failing boilers and cold radiators. Russia’s latest strike targeted the systems that turn energy into daily life, revealing why winter infrastructure has become a weapon.
As 2026 opens, the war in Ukraine is no longer defined by headlines or symbolic victories. It is being shaped by attrition on the battlefield, mounting financial strain in Europe, and institutional contradictions in the West. This long read examines how those pressures are converging — and whether they point toward an endgame, or a more dangerous phase ahead.
War is no longer disrupting global trade. It is being written into the contracts and insurance frameworks that make trade possible. As war risk pricing, listed areas, and standard charterparty clauses harden into routine procedure, conflict becomes a toll. Watch the insurance market, not the speeches. It signals what the world is normalising.