Locked Out of Power: The Price of Germany’s Refusal to Work With the AfD
It began as a tactical barrier: an internal pledge among the Union parties that they would never cooperate with the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). What started as a moral gesture has since hardened into a structural feature of German politics. It divides the electorate, entrenches a permanent imbalance of power, and produces the very outcomes it was meant to prevent.
The electoral paradox
Germany’s conservatives built their barrier in 2018 to prevent voters from drifting to the populist right. Seven years later, the opposite has happened. The AfD has supplanted the Christian Democrats across much of the East, polling near 30 percent in Saxony and Thuringia and over 25 percent nationally. In Brandenburg’s 2024 election, the AfD came first in votes but was excluded from every governing combination. The Social Democrats, who had slumped to historic lows after the failures of the traffic light coalition, survived only because the exclusion mechanism kept the right divided.
At the federal level, the numbers tell the same story. In the February 2025 election, the Union parties and the AfD together commanded over 45 percent of the vote. Yet the centre right remains locked in an uneasy partnership with the very left wing parties it claims to oppose. The result is a government paralysed by contradiction, sustained not by public confidence but by arithmetic and taboo.
Who gains and who loses
For the left, the arrangement is a godsend. It ensures that no matter how far their vote share falls, they retain a decisive voice in government formation. It is the only reason the SPD still holds cabinet seats and the only reason the Greens are likely to enter the next coalition. In parts of East Germany, it has kept the left alive where it would otherwise have been extinguished.
The barrier spares the AfD from association with government failures. Every unpopular reform, every botched energy policy, every immigration scandal belongs solely to the establishment parties. By keeping the AfD out of responsibility, the political class has made it the only pure alternative in sight. As the economy worsens and frustration deepens, voters who want change have nowhere else to go.
The Union’s failing strategy
For the CDU and CSU, the mechanism has become self destructive. What was once a short term tactic has turned into an ideology of exclusion. Instead of stemming defections to the AfD, it has accelerated them. Across the East, the AfD now sets the agenda; in some regions it is within reach of absolute majorities. The Union, meanwhile, is trapped in coalitions with rivals who openly wish to replace them.
Prominent figures within the party, among them Peter Tauber, one of the original architects of the exclusion policy, have begun to question its purpose. Tauber warned that demonisation strengthens the AfD rather than weakening it. A number of CDU politicians from eastern states have joined him, calling for a new realism in dealing with the populist right. Yet Chancellor Friedrich Merz has doubled down, insisting there will be no cooperation in any form.
Pressure building, outcomes narrowing
Germany’s political system is now saturated with potential energy. Three outcomes are possible.
One. The Union persuades its current partners to adopt pragmatic reforms on energy, welfare, and migration that remove the issues feeding the AfD. This would defuse the crisis but requires a level of cooperation the left shows no sign of offering.
Two. The left pushes for a formal ban on the AfD through the Constitutional Court, using the apparatus of the state to eliminate its main competitor. Such a move would give the left an artificial super majority but at the cost of destroying democratic legitimacy.
Three. The barrier eventually breaks. Under electoral or internal pressure, the Union begins some form of cooperation with the AfD, either openly or through toleration arrangements in the Länder. This would trigger outrage from the left but could realign German politics in a matter of months.
The likely path
Of these, the first seems naive and the second catastrophic. The third, though unthinkable today, is the most probable. Political systems cannot indefinitely deny half the electorate a route to power. When moral posture becomes institutional paralysis, collapse follows. The Union can continue reciting its prohibitions and losing ground, or it can confront reality and absorb the force it helped to create.
Germany’s right will not vanish by decree. The longer the exclusion persists, the stronger the alternative becomes.
