Who Decides the US Economy? The Quiet War Over Antitrust, Power, and Democracy
by Jaffa Levy
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Most people assume there are rules that stop very large companies from swallowing rivals until only a few giants remain. In the United States, that assumption is not wrong. For more than a century, antitrust law has existed to prevent mergers that substantially lessen competition and to stop dominant firms abusing market power. The idea is simple enough. Markets should remain open. Power should be contested. Consumers, workers, and smaller businesses should not be crushed by sheer scale.
But laws do not enforce themselves. Antitrust is not a magic switch that flips automatically when companies grow too large. It is a system, dependent on institutions and people. It relies on economists who measure market concentration, investigators who examine internal documents, lawyers who test theories in court, and commissioners who decide whether to challenge or allow deals. One of the two main federal bodies responsible for this work is the Federal Trade Commission, the FTC.
That is why what is happening now matters so much. At the precise moment that the largest media companies in the world are attempting to merge into even larger entities, the Supreme Court is considering whether the President can remove the very regulators tasked with stopping excessive concentration. This is not coincidence. It is convergence.
The question is no longer only whether a merger should be approved. It is who has the power to decide, on what basis, and in whose interest.
Antitrust is a system, not a slogan
Antitrust law rests on two basic principles. First, mergers that significantly reduce competition should be blocked or constrained. Second, firms that already dominate a market should not use that dominance to exclude rivals or extract unfair terms. These principles are widely supported across the political spectrum, at least in theory.
In practice, everything depends on enforcement. The FTC was created in 1914 precisely because lawmakers recognised that leaving markets to police themselves leads to concentration, abuse, and political capture. Its commissioners serve fixed terms and, by law, can only be removed for cause. This insulation was designed to protect decision making from political pressure. It was meant to ensure that enforcement turned on evidence rather than loyalty.
What the FTC actually does
The FTC reviews major mergers, investigates anti competitive conduct, brings enforcement actions in court, and studies markets where concentration threatens consumers or workers. Its independence exists so that these decisions are based on economic evidence, not political favour.
A live corporate battle with public consequences
In early December 2025, the abstract became concrete. Netflix agreed a deal to acquire major Warner Bros Discovery assets, a transaction valued by analysts at over eighty billion dollars once debt and assumptions were included. Days later, Paramount Skydance launched a hostile bid for all of Warner Bros Discovery, valued at more than one hundred billion dollars.
These are not ordinary corporate transactions. Warner Bros Discovery controls film studios, television production, and vast content libraries that shape what millions of people watch. Who owns those assets affects subscription prices, advertising markets, creative labour, and the diversity of voices that reach the public.
Under normal circumstances, regulators would ask a familiar set of questions. Does this reduce competition in streaming and content production. Will it give one company undue power over creators or distributors. Are there realistic remedies that would protect the public interest.
The case that changes the rules
On the same day that Paramount Skydance made its bid, the Supreme Court heard arguments in a case called Trump v Slaughter. At issue is whether the President can fire a sitting FTC commissioner at will. For ninety years, a precedent known as Humphrey’s Executor has said no. Commissioners may be removed only for cause, such as misconduct or neglect of duty.
The case asks the Court to undo that protection. Supporters of the so called unitary executive theory argue that all executive power must ultimately rest with the President. In their view, independent agencies are unaccountable and unconstitutional. Critics respond that without insulation, regulation becomes a political tool rather than a public safeguard.
Humphrey’s Executor in plain terms
The 1935 decision upheld limits on a President’s power to fire FTC commissioners. It exists to prevent enforcement decisions from turning on political loyalty. If overturned, commissioners could be removed simply for displeasing the White House.
Why timing is everything
A merger of this scale is not just a private affair. It is a public decision with long term consequences. If the FTC remains independent, its analysis is meant to turn on evidence, market structure, and likely harm. If commissioners can be fired at will, independence becomes conditional.
At that point, incentives change. Regulators become cautious. Corporations adapt by investing less in legal and economic arguments and more in political relationships. Influence replaces evidence as the decisive currency.
Follow the incentives
When regulators fear dismissal, bold enforcement declines. When politics matters more than law, corporations redirect effort toward access and favour. This outcome is not corruption. It is predictable behaviour.
Who benefits
The beneficiaries of this shift are not consumers or workers. They are the presidency as an institution, which gains leverage over enforcement, and the largest corporations, which can afford political access and risk management. Financial intermediaries, lobbyists, and deal makers thrive in an environment where regulatory outcomes depend on relationships.
Smaller competitors, independent creators, and ordinary consumers lose. They lack the scale and influence to compete in a politicised system.
How wealth moves upward
Consolidation concentrates bargaining power. That power becomes pricing power. Prices rise or quality falls. Workers face weaker bargaining positions. Over time, wealth flows upward to executives and shareholders while the public pays more for less.
From merger to higher bills
Consolidation reduces competition. Reduced competition increases leverage. Increased leverage raises prices and squeezes labour. The cost of living rises quietly, without a single dramatic decision.
Why independence existed at all
Independent regulators were not created out of academic idealism. They were responses to failure. In the early twentieth century, unchecked trusts captured markets and politics alike. The FTC was meant to separate enforcement from patronage, to ensure that economic power could be challenged without political permission.
Weakening that separation revives the very conditions antitrust was designed to prevent.
What is really at stake
This is not about one president or one merger. It is about whether markets are governed by rules or by relationships. Whether democracy restrains concentrated power or is bypassed by it. If enforcement credibility collapses, the economy drifts toward oligarchy, where outcomes are decided by access rather than merit.
The public may never read a Supreme Court opinion or an FTC filing. But they will feel the result in higher bills, fewer choices, and a growing sense that the system is rigged. That is why this fight matters.
