Theft on the High Seas: How the US Is Taking Venezuelan Tankers Without War, Mandate, or Law

This is what illegality looks like at sea.

Commercial oil tankers are being boarded on the high seas. Crews are being detained. Vessels are being diverted. Cargoes are being taken. None of this is occurring in a declared war. None of it is authorised by the United Nations. And none of it fits within the narrow, orthodox exceptions that international maritime law permits.

Strip away the euphemisms and the novelty. What is happening off Venezuela is not a diplomatic dispute. It is a jurisdictional breach. The law of the sea is explicit: a properly flagged vessel on the high seas falls under the exclusive authority of its flag state. Interference by others is prohibited. Sanctions do not change that rule. Politics does not suspend it. Enforcement does not replace it.

And yet the interference is happening.

Open source maritime intelligence has tracked a rapid surge of tanker departures from Venezuelan waters, followed by clustering in the Caribbean and the Atlantic. OSINT accounts describe satellite detections, AIS behaviour consistent with evasion, and US naval assets positioned along likely transit routes.

Within that picture, several vessels are reported as having been boarded and seized, with crews taken into custody and ships diverted. Others are tracked as targets or identified as having contested registry status. The reporting is live and contested, but the operational pattern is consistent: detection, approach, boarding, custody.

• GALILEO (ex VERONICA, IMO 9256860) — reported renamed; reported empty of oil cargo; reported homeport Taganrog.
• VOLANS (IMO 9422988) — reported carrying oil; reported as having no valid flag.
• NAYARA (IMO 9264570) — reported oil cargo; reported no flag indicator.
• LYRA (IMO 9314088) — reported oil cargo; reported no flag indicator.
• MIN HANG (IMO 9257137) — reported oil cargo; reported no flag indicator.
• OLINA (IMO 9282479) — reported oil cargo; reported false flag indicator.
• ROSALIN (IMO 9253325) — tracked as a Caribbean lead.
• LYDYA N (IMO 9153525) — tracked near Colombia.

Telegraph Online treats these identifications as provisional OSINT, not adjudicated fact. Their importance lies not in precision but in pattern: a sanctions regime that has moved from paper compliance to physical coercion.

This is the point most coverage avoids. There is no general right in international law to enforce unilateral sanctions on the high seas. Sanctions are domestic legal instruments. They bind persons, companies, banks, and assets within the jurisdiction of the sanctioning state. They do not create a licence to board foreign ships.

The United States’ reported legal theory turns on a single word: stateless. International law allows warships to approach and board a vessel suspected of having no nationality for the limited purpose of verifying its status. That is the exception. It is narrow, technical, and easily abused.

Crucially, statelessness permits verification. It does not, by itself, authorise seizure, diversion, cargo confiscation, or prolonged detention of crew.

The tankers involved are commercial vessels. They are not pirate ships. They are not engaged in the slave trade. If they are properly flagged, then international law is unequivocal: they fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag state.

Absent flag state consent, UN Security Council authorisation, or a recognised state of armed conflict, boarding or interdicting such vessels is unlawful. Unilateral sanctions do not create an exception. That is why disputes over registry, flag validity, and alleged false flag status are decisive. If the flag stands, the interference collapses.

The visible act is boarding. The lasting damage comes later. Insurance is withdrawn. Classification is questioned. Ports refuse entry. Once a vessel’s legal identity is destabilised, statelessness becomes easier to allege and interdiction easier to justify. Enforcement moves first. Law is argued afterwards.

The United States has not declared war on Venezuela. It has not declared a blockade. It has not secured UN authorisation. Yet it is boarding, detaining, diverting, and seizing ships on the high seas.

If this can be normalised by calling it sanctions enforcement, then the neutrality of the sea has already been hollowed out. Not by treaty change, but by practice. Others will study it. Others will copy it. And the smallest word in the dispute will continue to carry the heaviest weight: stateless.