As Russia’s central bank brings its claim against Euroclear before a Moscow court, the EU’s attempt to mobilise immobilised sovereign assets without crossing into confiscation faces its first live legal test. The case exposes where risk truly lies in Europe’s reparations loan strategy: not in rhetoric, but in custody, immunity, and Member State balance sheets.
Britain once sold trust to the world. That trust was forged in power, then refined into a services export: English law, City custody, and a reputation that money held here stayed safe from politics. The move from freezing Russian reserves to using, and possibly taking, them risks a slow credibility leak. In finance, leaks compound. The cost is drift, not drama.
Europe is moving from freezing Russian sovereign assets to institutionalising the freeze and building Ukraine finance on top of it. That shift invites a long legal campaign, concentrates liability in Belgium, and quietly burns Europe’s custody trust premium across global markets
This capstone article, the fourth in Telegraph Online’s series on frozen Russian assets, explains why banks and financial institutions in the City of London are pushing back against plans to use frozen Russian state money to fund loans for Ukraine. The dispute is not about morality or support for Ukraine. It is about legal ownership, court enforceability, retaliation risk, and who pays if the plan triggers lawsuits or financial instability.