After U.S. Air Strikes on Iran, Russia’s Reported Su-35 Delivery Could Add a New Air-Power Layer to Tehran’s Retaliation Strategy
Russia’s reported completion of the first Su-35 fighter jets for Iran now belongs to the war story, not the arms-sales column.
The United States has struck Iran again in the past 24 hours. Iran has answered with missile and drone attacks on American military sites in the Gulf. Tehran and its aligned media now present the retaliation as a sustained campaign, not a single symbolic reply. The message is simple enough: American bases around Iran are no longer outside the battlefield.
Iranian accounts say rockets and drones have hit U.S.-linked facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE over recent days and weeks. Kuwait’s Ali al-Salem and Ahmad al-Jaber airbases, Bahrain’s Sheikh Isa airbase and U.S. Fifth Fleet facilities in Manama have all been named in reports of the campaign. Some accounts put the number of affected sites above 20. Washington disputes the scale. The physical damage picture remains contested. But the strategic point is already hard to avoid: Iran has shown that America’s regional basing network can be reached.
The Su-35 is not arriving into a quiet procurement cycle. It is being discussed while missiles are flying, Gulf air defences are active, American strikes are hitting Iranian territory, and Tehran is trying to show that U.S. power projection carries a price. If Russia has indeed completed a first batch of 20 aircraft for Iran, the timing is no longer technical. It is political and military.
Su-35: Key Characteristics
- Type: Russian heavy multirole fighter, often described as a fourth-generation-plus aircraft.
- Role: Air superiority, interception, long-range patrol and limited strike missions.
- Range: Long-range combat aircraft suited to a large territorial state such as Iran.
- Radar: Powerful onboard radar designed to detect and track multiple aerial targets.
- Manoeuvrability: High agility, assisted by thrust-vectoring engines.
- Weapons: Capable of carrying modern air-to-air missiles and selected air-to-ground weapons.
- Strategic value for Iran: Would add a manned air-combat layer to a deterrent currently centred on missiles, drones and air defences.
- Limitation: Requires trained pilots, hardened bases, maintenance crews, spare parts, weapons integration and Russian technical support.
There is still no public proof that the fighters have arrived in Iran. No verified images from Iranian bases. The aircraft may still be in Russia. But the report itself has acquired a sharper meaning because of the war.
Iran’s strength has been built around missiles, drones, maritime pressure, allied forces and geography. Its weakness has always been in the air. Its manned fighter fleet remains old, improvised and badly outmatched. Much of it still depends on aircraft bought before the 1979 revolution, older Russian platforms and years of difficult maintenance. Tehran has kept old aircraft alive. It has not built a modern air force.
That gap matters more when American aircraft and stand-off weapons are striking Iranian targets. Iran can punish fixed bases in the Gulf. It can threaten shipping. It can launch drones and ballistic missiles. But it still has limited ability to contest the airspace above its own territory against the United States or Israel. The Su-35 is meant to narrow that gap.
That is the important point. Iran’s rockets have already shown reach. Its drones have shown persistence. The Su-35 would add speed, radar and manned air combat to a deterrent structure that has mostly relied on missiles, unmanned systems and regional geography. It would not replace Iran’s existing arsenal. It would give that arsenal another layer.
Russia’s role has become more serious as well. Supplying Su-35s to Iran during an open confrontation with the United States would not be an ordinary export decision. It would be a strategic signal. Moscow would be telling Washington that pressure on Tehran will not leave Iran isolated, and that the Russia-Iran military relationship now moves in both directions.
Russia has reasons to do it. Iran has been useful to Moscow, especially through drone cooperation and broader wartime alignment. A fighter transfer would reward that relationship and deepen it. But Moscow will also move carefully. The Su-35 is not surplus equipment. Russia needs advanced aircraft for its own forces. Production is limited. Any delivery to Iran would be a deliberate choice, not a casual transaction.
Israel will not treat 20 Su-35s as a revolution. But it would be reckless to dismiss the aircraft. A properly supported Iranian Su-35 force would add risk.
For Washington, the concern is the pipeline. Fighters, trainers, helicopters, air-defence systems, drones, missiles and technical support all point to a deeper Russia-Iran military exchange. This is not sentimental alliance-building. It is more practical than that. Russia and Iran are useful to each other, and usefulness can be more durable than rhetoric.
This article treats the reported Su-35 transfer as unconfirmed until aircraft are publicly shown in Iran or otherwise verified as operational there.
