A ground level briefing on what “running Venezuela” would actually require, why decapitation was a gamble, and the next seventy two hour decision tree.
The reported capture of Venezuela’s president by foreign special forces early this morning, has shocked the world.
Not because Nicolás Maduro is admired. Not because his government is popular. But because, if the claim is true, it represents something far more serious than regime hostility or diplomatic rupture. It marks the forcible seizure of a sitting head of state by another country’s military on his own territory.
That act, if confirmed, crosses a line that has been treated as untouchable since the Second World War.
This editorial will set out why the alleged capture of President Maduro is such a profound shock to the international system, why it matters regardless of views about his rule, and why the legal justification advanced for it fails. But first, the record must be corrected.
The government that has been targeted was not a foreign imposition, nor an unelected junta.
Legitimacy and the Record the West Prefers to Forget
Much of the language used against the Venezuelan state relies on a convenient distortion: the claim that the Chávez and Maduro governments were never legitimately chosen by the Venezuelan people.
That claim is false.
Hugo Chávezcame to power through elections, not a coup. He won the 1998 presidential election decisively after the collapse of Venezuela’s discredited two party system. Over the next fourteen years, he repeatedly subjected his authority to the electorate. A new constitution was approved by referendum. Fresh elections were held under that constitution. A national recall referendum was triggered against him and he survived it. He then won further presidential elections.
Chávez did not rule because he was imposed. He ruled because he kept winning votes.
Maduro inherited that system and was also elected. In 2013, following Chávez’s death, Maduro won a presidential election, narrowly but decisively enough to be certified by Venezuela’s electoral authorities. His later re elections took place under conditions that were narrower, harsher, and widely criticised, but they were still elections conducted within the country’s constitutional framework.
A flawed election is not the same thing as no election. A degraded mandate is not the same thing as none at all.
By contrast, the Venezuelan opposition has not won a presidential election since 1998. Its most significant victory was the 2015 parliamentary election. When that failed to translate into executive power, the opposition shifted strategy. Ballots were replaced by boycotts. Domestic mobilisation was replaced by foreign recognition. Authority was claimed without winning a nationwide vote.
This distinction matters because legitimacy in international law does not depend on approval by Washington. It depends on elections, continuity, and control.
Electoral Record in Brief
Hugo Chávez won multiple national elections and referenda between 1998 and 2012, including presidential elections, constitutional referenda, and a recall vote. His mandate was repeatedly renewed at the ballot box.
Nicolás Maduro was elected president in 2013 following Chávez’s death and subsequently re elected under increasingly restrictive conditions. Elections continued to occur within Venezuela’s constitutional framework, even as legitimacy eroded over time.
The opposition has not won a presidential election since 1998. Its later claims to executive authority were not based on a national vote.
This context does not absolve Maduro’s failures. But it does establish one essential fact. The government targeted was sovereign.
The Shock of the Capture
Against that backdrop, the reported seizure of President Maduro by foreign special forces is what has stunned observers.
According to statements from the United States president, American forces carried out a large scale military operation inside Venezuela and removed Maduro from the country. The action was presented as enforcement of criminal indictments.
Venezuela’s government has not confirmed the capture. Senior officials say they do not know the president’s whereabouts and have demanded proof of life. What is beyond dispute is that explosions were reported in and around Caracas, low flying aircraft were observed, and the capital entered a state of emergency.
What Is Happening Now in Venezuela
With President Maduro reportedly removed, executive visibility has shifted to Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, who has addressed the nation and asserted continuity of government. The armed forces remain under the command of Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino López, who has reaffirmed control over military units and strategic installations.
Security forces are deployed across Caracas at key sites including the presidential palace, military bases, broadcasting facilities, and transport hubs. The Bolivarian National Militia has been placed on heightened readiness, with loyalist civilian structures mobilised for internal order and territorial control rather than external defence.
Civilian social media reflects shock, confusion, and fear rather than celebration. Power disruptions, road closures, and uncertainty about authority persist in the capital.
This is the environment in which the legal consequences must be judged.
The Legal Indictment
If the American claim is taken as true, what occurred is not an escalation. It is a rupture.
One state forcibly seizing the sitting head of another sovereign government on its own territory, without consent and without authorisation from the United Nations, is among the most extreme acts of aggression since 1945.
The rule being violated is not obscure. It sits at the heart of the post war order. The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of any state except in strict self defence or with explicit Security Council approval.
Neither condition appears to apply.
The justification advanced by Washington is that longstanding criminal indictments permit enforcement action. That argument collapses immediately. Domestic criminal charges do not authorise foreign military operations. Extradition treaties exist precisely to prevent law enforcement from turning into unilateral armed intervention.
If indictments were sufficient, any powerful state could abduct any foreign leader by filing charges at home. International law was created to prevent exactly this.
Even under American domestic law, the constitutional basis for such an operation is highly contested. There has been no declaration of war, no congressional authorisation, and no clear claim of imminent self defence. The seizure of a foreign head of state by military force is an act of war in all but name.
The Precedent
The post war international order rests on a fragile bargain: that power is restrained by rules, and that even the strongest states accept limits on what they may do to the weakest.
If the forcible removal of a sovereign leader is allowed to stand, that bargain is broken.
Other states will not ask whether the act was lawful. They will ask whether it worked.
That is how norms die.
This moment will not remain confined to Venezuela. If law dies in Caracas, it will not stay there.
