Editor’s note: This article reports and analyses allegations and institutional responses arising from a publicly announced Swedish filing; where serious claims are referenced, they are attributed to the complainant or cited sources and are not stated as findings of fact by Telegraph Online.
On 17 December 2025, Julian Assange filed a criminal complaint in Sweden against 30 individuals associated with the Nobel Foundation, including senior leadership, in connection with the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado. The complaint seeks an immediate freeze of the 11 million SEK monetary transfer linked to the prize, the securing of the medal, and a criminal investigation into alleged misuse of the Nobel endowment.

Swedish authorities, in the first publicly reported procedural response, signalled reluctance. Swedish police were reported to have declined to open an investigation on the basis that the filing did not disclose information indicating a crime. Sweden’s Economic Crime Authority was reported to have said it lacked jurisdiction to handle the matter.

That apparent early resistance is unsurprising. It is also not the central issue Assange is trying to force onto the record.

Assange is not asking Sweden to arbitrate Venezuela’s politics. He is asking whether a peace endowment, created by will for a defined purpose, can be disbursed in circumstances he says are incompatible with that purpose, and whether fiduciary obligations apply to administrators even when selection is performed elsewhere. Put differently, his case is that a political decision in Oslo does not extinguish a legal duty in Stockholm.

The Nobel system has historically protected itself from such questions by keeping peace in the realm of moral symbolism. Assange is attempting to pull it into the realm of trust law, governance responsibility, and criminal liability. That move is lawfare in method. It is not frivolous in design.

What Assange alleges, and why the alleged wrong is financial, not political

Assange’s filing is framed publicly through a WikiLeaks statement issued in Stockholm at 11:00am CET on 17 December 2025. In that statement, Assange is described as accusing 30 individuals associated with the Nobel Foundation of “serious suspected crimes,” including “gross misappropriation of funds,” facilitation of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and financing the crime of aggression.

The complaint, the statement says, was submitted to the Swedish Economic Crime Authority (Ekobrottsmyndigheten) and the Swedish War Crimes Unit (Krigsbrottsenheten). It names Nobel Foundation chair Astrid Söderbergh Widding and executive director Hanna Stjärne among those accused.

Assange’s principal contention is not that the Norwegian Nobel Committee lacks authority to choose the Peace Prize laureate. It is that Swedish administrators of Nobel funds are fiduciaries with an independent obligation to ensure disbursements comply with Alfred Nobel’s intended purpose. The WikiLeaks statement quotes Assange as saying: “The political decision of the Norwegian selection committee does not suspend the fiduciary duty of Swedish funds administrators.” It then states his conclusion: “Any disbursement contradicting this mandate constitutes misappropriation from the endowment.”

This is the legal hinge. Assange’s claim is that there is a difference between selection and disbursement, and that a breach can occur at the point of payment even if the selection body acted within its powers.

The Nobel architecture that makes the complaint possible

The Nobel Peace Prize is structurally unusual. The other Nobel Prizes are anchored in Swedish institutions. The Peace Prize is selected in Norway. The Norwegian Nobel Committee is a five-member body elected by Norway’s parliament, the Storting, responsible for selecting the Peace Prize laureate.

The Nobel Foundation is based in Stockholm and exists to administer Alfred Nobel’s bequest and the Nobel system’s statutes and finances. It sits above the prize-awarding bodies as a governance and endowment framework.

Assange’s complaint relies on that split. He does not target the Norwegian committee as the principal defendant. He targets the administrators and overseers of funds in Sweden. His public reasoning is that the Swedish side is where fiduciary obligations attach, where disbursements occur, and where Swedish financial crime law could apply.

The Peace Prize Was Designed as a Counter-Institution

When Alfred Nobel wrote his will in 1895, there was no Peace Prize tradition to endorse. He created the prize as an institutional intervention, not a ceremonial honour. Unlike the other Nobel Prizes, which were anchored in Swedish scientific and cultural bodies, the Peace Prize was deliberately removed from Sweden and entrusted to a committee elected by Norway’s parliament. That choice insulated the prize from court politics, prestige cycles, and militarised nationalism.

The criteria Nobel set confirm the design. The Peace Prize was to reward work for fraternity between nations, the abolition or reduction of standing armies, and the promotion of peace congresses. This is an anti-militarist programme rooted in restraint, arbitration, and institutional diplomacy. It is not a prize for rhetoric, intention, or anticipated leadership.

That architecture cuts against the modern habit of treating the Peace Prize as a tool of geopolitical signalling. A prize designed to constrain power was not meant to validate it. When awarded as a badge of alignment, it risks drifting from a mechanism of restraint into a seal of political approval.

Why this is not simply “disagreement with the laureate”

Assange’s filing attempts to elevate a moral dispute into a fiduciary one. That shift matters because it changes the standard of debate.

A moral dispute is answered with argument and counter argument. A fiduciary dispute is answered by reference to purpose, duty, and whether funds have been diverted from their intended use.

WikiLeaks asserts that the Nobel Foundation has previously exercised supervisory authority over prizes and disbursements, pointing to the Literature Prize crisis in 2018, when the system intervened in governance and disbursement decisions in response to institutional failure. The public claim is simple: administrators have intervened before, therefore they cannot plausibly claim they are powerless when purpose is said to be violated.

Assange is using that asserted precedent to argue that failure to intervene now is not mere passivity but a breach of obligation.

This is also why he seeks the freezing of the prize money. The immediate relief sought is not reputational. It is financial. Stop the transfer, preserve the endowment, and treat the prize money as a restricted asset pending investigation.

The recipient’s record, stated not litigated

The 2025 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to María Corina Machado, a Venezuelan opposition leader. The Norwegian Nobel Committee’s published framing presents the award as recognition for promoting democratic rights and seeking a peaceful transition.

Assange’s case, as presented through WikiLeaks, is that Machado’s record is incompatible with Nobel’s stated peace criteria. He claims that she has advocated or endorsed foreign military intervention and escalation, and that awarding her the Peace Prize transforms the prize into a political instrument at the service of coercive state strategy.

Record: Machado and Israel

Machado’s Israel posture is presented by Assange’s supporters and critics as a relevant indicator of her foreign policy alignment. After her Nobel Peace Prize win, she held a publicised call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. According to Netanyahu’s office, she expressed support for Israel, welcomed the return of hostages under a Gaza ceasefire arrangement, and praised Israel’s stance against Iran, describing Iran as a threat to both countries.

Reuters has also reported that Machado has indicated she would move Venezuela’s embassy in Israel to Jerusalem if her movement assumes power.

Critics cite these positions as evidence that her “peace” profile is tightly bound to geopolitical alignment. Supporters argue they reflect solidarity with a democratic ally and opposition to militant and authoritarian blocs. In Assange’s case, these positions are presented as part of an alleged pattern inconsistent with Nobel’s anti-militarist purpose criteria.

Assange’s case for ineligibility, set out as allegations

The WikiLeaks statement summarising the complaint alleges a series of facts and quotations which it says demonstrate Machado’s ineligibility under Alfred Nobel’s will.

First, it alleges that Machado has endorsed or encouraged foreign military intervention in Venezuela, citing a quotation attributed to her dated 30 October 2025: “Military escalation may be the only way… the United States may need to intervene directly.”

Second, it alleges that Machado supported specific US military actions at sea. The statement claims she called US strikes on civilian vessels, which it says have killed at least 95 people, “justified” and “visionary.” It further claims the complaint argues Nobel administrators “knew or ought to have known” that disbursing the prize money would contribute to further unlawful harm.

Third, it alleges that Machado aligned herself with US escalation strategy by dedicating the Nobel prize to President Trump, with the statement attributing to her the view that he “finally has put Venezuela… in terms of a priority for the United States national security.”

Fourth, the statement cites historical material, including a quotation it attributes to 2014 testimony before the US Congress: “The only path left is the use of force.”

Fifth, the complaint is said to rely on external opposition to the award. The statement claims that 21 Norwegian peace organisations declared that Machado is “the opposite of a peace laureate.” It also attributes to Nobel Peace Prize laureate Adolfo Pérez Esquivel the statement that giving the prize to someone who calls for foreign invasion is a mockery of Nobel’s will. It further claims the Peace Research Institute Oslo confirmed that Machado “has called for military intervention in Venezuela.”

Assange’s logic, as publicly stated, is that these elements place Swedish administrators on notice. If they pay out while on notice, he argues, they cannot later say they were mere conduits. They become decision makers with responsibility and, in his framing, exposure.

Why Assange Says the Prize Funds Should Not Be Paid

In the criminal complaint described by WikiLeaks, Julian Assange argues that the pending 11 million SEK Peace Prize disbursement to María Corina Machado would constitute misappropriation of Alfred Nobel’s endowment because, on his case, she does not meet the Peace Prize criteria set out in Nobel’s 1895 will.

Assange’s argument is not that the Norwegian Nobel Committee lacked authority to select a laureate. It is that Swedish administrators of Nobel funds have an independent fiduciary duty to ensure that disbursements comply with the will’s purpose: rewarding work for fraternity between nations, the reduction or abolition of standing armies, and the promotion of peace congresses.

According to the WikiLeaks statement, the complaint alleges that Machado’s public record is incompatible with those criteria. It cites statements attributed to her in which she is said to have endorsed foreign military intervention in Venezuela, supported US military escalation, and described specific US strikes at sea as “justified” and “visionary.” The filing also refers to historical statements attributed to Machado, including testimony before the US Congress in 2014 in which she is quoted as saying: “The only path left is the use of force.”

The complaint further alleges that Machado aligned herself with coercive state strategy rather than restraint, including by dedicating the Peace Prize to the US president for elevating Venezuela as a US national security priority, and by praising Prime Minister Netanyahu’s conduct in Gaza. It argues that the Nobel award amplified her political influence at a moment of heightened military escalation.

On that basis, Assange contends that the funds are not merely controversial but purposively misdirected. If a laureate’s record is, as alleged, inconsistent with Nobel’s peace mandate, then payment of the prize money is said to amount to diversion of the endowment from its intended purpose. The misappropriation allegation arises not from disagreement with the selection, but from the claim that no lawful entitlement to the funds exists where the criteria are not met.

The complaint states that Swedish administrators were on notice of these issues, citing opposition from Norwegian peace organisations, criticism from a former Peace Prize laureate, and statements attributed to the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Failure to intervene despite that notice, Assange argues, converts a political award into a fiduciary breach.

The Obama precedent, and why it matters here

Assange’s complaint lands inside a broader modern discomfort with the Nobel Peace Prize. The discomfort is not new. It is institutional.

The 2009 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Barack Obama is frequently cited as an example of the prize being awarded on promise rather than record. At the time, the Nobel Committee’s language emphasised diplomacy and a new international tone. Obama himself framed the award as a “call to action.” Critics argued that a peace prize awarded at the start of a presidency turns the prize into a lever, a form of political endorsement rather than recognition of completed work.

After the award, Obama oversaw a major escalation in Afghanistan and a significant expansion of drone warfare as a central instrument of US counterterrorism policy. Supporters argue drones replaced larger wars and reduced conventional casualties. Critics argue they entrenched a new normal of remote killing and broadened conflict without adequate transparency or accountability.

Assange is attempting to take this long running cultural critique and reframe it as a fiduciary and legal critique. The concept is that a peace endowment cannot be treated as a branding tool for anticipated leadership. In his framing, it must be tethered to the will’s purpose criteria. Otherwise, the prize becomes whatever the committee wants it to be, while the endowment is spent as if purpose does not exist.

Why Swedish authorities are likely to resist, even if the argument is coherent

A Swedish prosecutor assessing this filing faces practical and institutional barriers.

First, jurisdiction. The selection decision is made in Norway. The disbursement is administered through a Swedish foundation. Assange’s bridge is fiduciary duty. Swedish authorities may view that bridge as too contested to sustain criminal liability.

Second, evidential sufficiency. Financial crime prosecutions typically require clear duty, clear diversion, clear intent, and clear gain. A dispute about the meaning of “peace” and whether a political actor fits Nobel’s criteria risks being characterised as an interpretive question rather than a criminal one.

Third, causation. The complaint, as described by WikiLeaks, attempts to connect disbursement of prize money to downstream state violence. That is an ambitious chain. Prosecutors are often unwilling to pursue remote causation theories without overwhelming evidence of purpose, knowledge, and material contribution.

Fourth, institutional impact. Even opening an investigation would embroil Sweden in a global political fight. That is not a reason not to investigate if a crime is clear. It is a reason authorities may be cautious where the alleged offence depends on contested political facts.

For Assange, however, a refusal to investigate does not answer his central question. It only shows that the Nobel Peace Prize has been placed beyond ordinary scrutiny by the aura it confers.

The unresolved question the Nobel system cannot avoid

Alfred Nobel’s will sets out a peace programme. Fraternity between nations. Reduction of standing armies. Promotion of peace congresses. Those are not open ended platitudes. They read as a constraint on militarism.

Modern practice has treated the Peace Prize as something broader, rewarding democratic movements, civil society leaders, and human rights figures. That evolution may be defensible as a political interpretation. It becomes fragile when recipients are credibly perceived, through public statements or alliances, as advocates of coercive intervention and escalation.

Assange’s complaint is designed to force the Nobel Foundation to answer whether the will is still operative as a purpose constraint. If it is, then administrators are not mere clerks. They have duties. If it is not, then the Nobel Peace Prize has become a political instrument with no internal limit, and the will becomes a decorative citation.

Sweden’s reported reluctance to entertain the complaint suggests the legal system may not wish to be the arena in which this question is fought. Yet the question does not go away. It migrates into credibility. A peace prize that can be awarded as a badge of alignment, while administrators disclaim responsibility for purpose, is no longer a counter institution. It is a prestige machine.

Assange may not obtain a Swedish prosecution. He may not need to. The filing forces the Nobel system into a narrower space than it prefers. Either peace is still tethered to restraint, or it is a flexible brand managed by committees and paid out by administrators who deny they have any role beyond processing. That is the institutional contradiction the complaint is built to expose.