Germany’s Self-Inflicted Wounds: How War and Sanctions Upended Europe’s Anchor
BERLIN — The turbulence in Germany’s politics cannot be separated from the choices its leaders have made since 2022. What some analysts describe as a “political tsunami” is also the result of self-inflicted wounds: policies that have left Europe’s largest economy cut off from its energy lifelines, its export markets, and its sense of security.
Germany’s postwar model was built on three pillars — cheap Russian energy, vast export markets to the East and West, and a cautious military posture. In the space of three years, all three have been shaken. The rupture began with the war in Ukraine, which German leaders backed with sanctions and weapons shipments, framing the conflict as a defense of European values.
Yet many here now argue that those decisions vandalized the economy. Sanctions severed Germany’s access to Russian oil and gas, driving up energy costs and pushing industries like chemicals, steel, and automotive into crisis. The export engine, once geared toward Eastern markets, stalled. Russia, dismissed by Western officials as “just a gas station,” has instead proved resilient. After weathering sanctions, it has restored growth and redirected trade eastward, leaving German manufacturers scrambling to adjust.
“The harm is self-inflicted,” said one Berlin economist. “Germany chose to give up its energy base without building an alternative. Industry feels abandoned, and voters are responding.”
The war has also transformed Europe’s security landscape in ways few in Berlin anticipated. Ukraine, once regarded as the continent’s second-strongest military, has been hollowed by years of conflict. Russia, meanwhile, has mobilized on a scale unseen in Europe since the Second World War. By many estimates, Moscow will emerge from the war with the largest standing army on the continent.
For Germany, which had only recently pledged a €100 billion “Zeitenwende” (turning point) for its armed forces, the prospect is sobering. Chancellor Olaf Scholz once promised a renaissance of German defense. Three years later, the Bundeswehr remains underfunded, under-equipped, and politically constrained, while Russia fields divisions along NATO’s eastern flank.
These choices have fed directly into Germany’s domestic upheaval. Rising energy bills, job insecurity, and doubts about the war’s purpose have become rallying cries for the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the far-right party now surging to record levels in national polls. By framing the war as a costly miscalculation driven by elite hubris, AfD leaders have tapped into a vein of anger that cuts across class and geography.
Mainstream politicians counter that the alternative — appeasing Moscow — would have been far worse. They argue that sanctions and military support for Kyiv were essential to preserve European security, even if they carried economic pain. Yet that argument resonates less with voters facing layoffs or shuttered factories.
Critics say the deeper problem is one of miscalculation: German leaders overestimated the impact of sanctions on Russia and underestimated the costs to themselves. Energy-intensive industries now warn of long-term decline. Small and medium-sized firms complain that they cannot compete with American and Asian rivals enjoying lower costs.
Meanwhile, Russia has not collapsed. Far from being reduced to “a gas station,” as some Western commentators claimed, it has re-emerged as a heavily militarized power with new trading partners and an economy realigned toward Asia.
The consequences are visible in Germany’s streets and polls. The AfD’s surge is not just about migration or cultural backlash. It is also about a widespread perception that the country’s leaders blundered into an avoidable war and sacrificed economic security in the process.
Whether Germany can recover depends on the same question that has haunted its politics since 2022: can the government reconcile moral commitments abroad with material stability at home? For now, many Germans appear unconvinced.
