In Tianjin, Putin Finds Old Friends and New Alignments

When Vladimir V. Putin stepped onto the red carpet in Tianjin last weekend, the choreography was as carefully managed as any in the long history of Sino-Russian relations. The Russian leader’s arrival for the 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit was not merely a diplomatic courtesy. It was an act of political theater, crafted to signal that Moscow is not isolated, at least not in the halls of China’s growing regional bloc.

The SCO, once a modest Eurasian security forum, now stretches across Asia, Europe, and into Africa. With 26 members, it commands nearly half the world’s population and a quarter of its economic output. What began in 2001 as an attempt to stabilize borders has become a stage on which Beijing projects a new order — one less tethered to Washington or Brussels.

And in Tianjin, Mr. Putin found himself cast in a central role.

A Red Carpet in Tianjin

Chinese state media showed the Russian president descending from his aircraft and greeted by honor guards. The reporting emphasized warmth: Xi Jinping, China’s leader, referred to his counterpart as an “old friend.” Mr. Putin, in turn, described the welcome as “without parallel.”

Such language may sound routine, but in Chinese political discourse it matters. “Old friend” is a term reserved for leaders deemed reliable, those who have weathered storms together. In the middle of Russia’s grinding war in Ukraine and continuing Western sanctions, this was more than courtesy; it was endorsement.

For Beijing, hosting Mr. Putin alongside Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi allowed China to showcase its position at the center of a recalibrated triangle. State outlets in Beijing spoke of “multipolarity” and a “shared future,” presenting the SCO as both counterbalance and alternative to Western alliances.

Moscow’s Narrative: Not Alone

Russian coverage echoed the theme of solidarity. Outlets such as RIA Novosti portrayed the summit as vindication of Russia’s standing. Mr. Putin’s presence at the table with Mr. Xi and Mr. Modi was framed as proof that, despite Western sanctions and isolation, Russia retains powerful allies.

Kremlin-aligned media played up his bilateral meetings. There was talk of strengthening ties with Iran, which also sent high-level representatives. There was coverage of security guarantees, energy deals, and future integration across Eurasia. Even small details — like Mr. Putin’s decision to travel the 120 kilometers from Tianjin to Beijing by motorcade instead of aircraft — were presented as evidence of his calm confidence.

In Russian media, Ukraine was mentioned but reframed. Mr. Putin used the SCO platform to argue that the war was the result of NATO provocation, not Russian aggression. Western headlines focused on the deflection. Russian ones emphasized that other SCO leaders did not publicly contradict him.

India’s Balancing Act

If China and Russia dominated the summit, Indian coverage found its own narrative. Newspapers in New Delhi lingered on the personal rapport between Mr. Modi and Mr. Putin. Photographs of the two leaders smiling and shaking hands became some of the most widely circulated images on Chinese social media.

The Times of India described their interactions as “brotherly.” Commentators suggested that India, facing tariff pressure from the United States, has every incentive to deepen its ties with Moscow. Yet the tone remained cautious. India has not endorsed Russia’s war in Ukraine, and its relationship with Washington — particularly in defense and technology — remains significant.

Still, the optics in Tianjin were clear: India was present, engaged, and willing to be seen in public solidarity with Russia and China.

The SCO’s Expanding Reach

The summit itself was not short on deliverables. Leaders signed the “Tianjin Declaration” and approved a 10-year development strategy. Proposals for an SCO development bank, an energy cooperation platform, and centers for artificial intelligence and digital economy were pushed forward by Beijing.

Chinese newspapers presented these outcomes as institutional breakthroughs. “The SCO has become a family across three continents,” one editorial declared. “Its responsibility is not only to our peoples but to global stability.”

Foreign Minister Wang Yi enumerated “eight major outcomes,” ranging from enhanced counterterrorism cooperation to expanded educational exchange. These were framed less as technical steps than as markers of a bloc evolving into a permanent feature of the international system.

Theatrics and Symbolism

What stood out most was the staging. Armored motorcades, red-carpet ceremonies, and highly publicized trilateral huddles between Xi, Putin, and Modi offered images of solidarity. At a time when the United States is doubling down on alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the SCO summit in Tianjin projected a competing tableau: three major powers standing shoulder to shoulder.

The symbolism was amplified by absences. No Western leader attended, and most Western diplomats kept their distance. To Beijing, that was the point. The SCO is portrayed as a structure unbound by Washington’s architecture.

The carefully curated optics — smiles, handshakes, and camaraderie — do not erase underlying tensions. India and China remain locked in border disputes. Russia and China are close but wary partners. Yet in the controlled environment of Tianjin, such complexities receded behind the drumbeat of unity.

Strategic Messaging

The SCO’s messaging is not subtle. Chinese outlets repeatedly invoked the “Shanghai Spirit” — shorthand for mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for civilizations, and common development. State media said it was this ethos that set the SCO apart from Western institutions, which they accused of “Cold War thinking” and “hegemonism.”

Mr. Xi used his keynote address to position the SCO as a guardian of post-World War II order and a reformer of global governance. He pledged billions in aid and loans to SCO members, promised greater integration of China’s BeiDou satellite system, and called for expanded cultural and educational ties.

For Mr. Putin, the platform offered a chance to argue that Russia is part of a larger movement resisting Western dominance. For Mr. Modi, it was an opportunity to balance between East and West, projecting India as a player not bound to either side.

Between Parade and Policy

The timing of the SCO summit, on the eve of China’s vast military parade in Beijing, was no accident. The parade — with its goose-stepping soldiers, armored vehicles, and missile launchers — is designed to impress domestic audiences and intimidate foreign ones.

Together, the summit and parade create a sequence: diplomacy in Tianjin, spectacle in Beijing. One offers the image of cooperative bloc-building, the other of raw military power. For China, this dual performance reinforces its claim to leadership of a rising order. For Russia, it provides a stage on which it is not merely a pariah but a central actor. For India, it offers visibility without binding commitments.

Reading the Signals

Viewed through the lens of intelligence analysis, the Tianjin summit provided several indicators:

• China seeks institutional permanence. By expanding SCO’s scope, Beijing is embedding itself in global governance outside Western frameworks.
• Russia seeks legitimacy. Mr. Putin’s welcome — carefully staged — is meant to show his domestic audience that he still matters internationally.
• India seeks maneuverability. Mr. Modi’s presence signals hedging, not alliance, but it keeps channels open.
• The West is deliberately excluded. The absence of Western leaders or acknowledgment reinforces the SCO’s role as counter-architecture.

Conclusion

In Tianjin, Mr. Putin found both comfort and utility. The comfort came in the handshakes, the smiles, the red carpet. The utility came in the message: Russia is not alone, at least not in Asia.

For China, the summit reaffirmed its role as convener and agenda-setter. For India, it was an exercise in balance. For the rest of the world, it was a reminder that beneath the surface of military parades and official communiqués lies a slow but deliberate effort to redraw the map of international power.